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LABOR LAW
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT- MOTOR CARRIER ACT:
WEIGHT GIVEN TO PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE INTER-
PRETATION OF INTER-RELATED STATUTES
Plaintiff, who had been driver for defendant, a contract carrier
of mail for the Post Office Department, seeks recovery of comp-
pensation for over-time employment under Section 207 of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.' Defendant contends that the case falls
within Section 213 (b) (I), which exempts from Section 207 those
employees over whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has
power to establish . . . maximum hours of service under the Motor
Carrier Act, and that employees of contract carriers are designated
as one such class.2  Held, for the plaintiff on the basis of an I.C.C.
ruling that a contract mail carrier is not subject to the Motor Car-
rier Act as a contract carrier.3 Thompson v. Daugherty, 40 F.
Supp. 279 (D. Md. 194). In another case similarly involving these
sections the court referred to a ruling of the I.C.C.4 but held that
it "independently" also found plaintiff mechanic to be within the
purview of the Motor Carrier Act because his duties affected the
safety of operation of vehicles in interstate commerce. F Vest v.
Smwky Mountains Stages, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 296 (N. D. Ga. 1941).
It is well settled that the cardinal principle of statutory interpre-
tation and'construction is to give effect to the intent of the legisla-
ture.5 In each of the two principal cases, the court followed the
oft-stated rule that a practical or administrative construction of an
ambiguous statute is entitled to great weight.6 The court in the
152 STAT. 1060, 29 U. S. C. A. (1938).
249 STAT. 543, 49 U. S. C. A. See. 304 (a) (2) (1935).
3 M[otor Carrier Cases 694, 697.
Report in Ex Porte No. MC-2 and Ex Parte No. AIC-3, Mar. 13, 1941.
5James v. Milwaukee, 16 Wall. 159, 21 L. Ed. 267 (1872); Wolsey v. Chapman, 101
U. S. 755, 769, 25 L. Ed. 915, 920 (1879); U. S. v. Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R. Co., 222
U. S. 8, 32 Sup. Ct. 6, 56 L. Ed. 68 (1911); The Schooner Paulina' Cargo v. U. S.. 7
Cranch 52, 60, 3 L, Ed. 266. 269 (1812); Erie R. Co. v. Steinberg, 94 Ohio St. 189, 203,
113 N. E. 814, 818, L. R. A. 1917B, 787, 792 (1916); Buckman v. State, 81 Ohio St.
171, 178-179, 90 N. E. 158 (1909).
6 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY COxSTRUCTION (2d ed. 1904) Sec. 474; Baze v. Scott,
106 F. (2d) 365 (C. C. A. Okla. 1939); Carolina Music Co. v. Query, 192 S. C. 303,
312, 6 S. E. (2d) 473, 475 (1939); Poole v. Saxon Mills, 6 S. E. (2d) 761, 764, 192
S. C. 339, 347 (1939); Broderick v. Keefe, 112 F. (2d) 293, 296 (C. C. A. R. I. 1940);
cf. Saks v. Higgins, 111 F. (2d) 78, affirming 29 F. Supp. 996 (C. C. A. N. Y. 1940)
("is often highly persuasive."); Industrial Commission v. Brown, 92 Ohio St. 309, 311,
110 N. E. 744, 745 (1915); State ex rel. Crabbe v. Middletown Hydraulic Co., 114 Ohio
St. 437, 453, 151 N. E. 653 (1926).
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Thompson case gave little reason for its decision other than the in-
terpretative ruling of the I.C.C. In the West case, the court indi-
cated that it regarded the admininstrative interpretation as a factor
to be considered in making its decision. Although courts have said
that such determinations "afford a presumption of the meaning" -
and "should control and be followed unless manifestly wrong," 8 the
generally accepted rule is that such practical constructions are never
binding upon the courts.' In Magann v. Longs Baggage Transfer
Co., Inc.,'0 a contemporaneous case squarely "on all fours" with the
Thompson case, another district court, confronted with the same
I.C.C. ruling, rejected it and held that a contract mail carrier was
within the Motor Carrier Act. The court carefully noted that the
statement of the Commission denying its jurisdiction over contract
carriers of mail in vehicles used exclusively for that purpose, was
merely dictum, and clearly not binding upon the court, since the
application presented to the Commission raised only the question as
to its jurisdiction over carriers who transport mail along with bag-
gage, express, and newspapers. The weight given to such rulings
is due largely to the fact that they are handed down by the men
charged specially with the administration or enforcement of the
statute, and also because the legislature is presumed to have ac-
quiesced in the interpretation by failing subsequently to alter the
law." In the principal cases this presumption is inapplicable be-
cause the statutes involved are of recent origin."
This rule as to the weight of an administrative interpretation
has often been used by the courts merely as a device to justify the
resort to a practical interpretation by disregarding the literal mean-
.Midway Co. v. Eaton, 183 U. S. 602, 609, 46 L. Ed. 347, 353, 22 Sup. Ct. 261 (1902).
Surgstt v. Laplice, 8 How. 48, 12 L. Ed. 982 (1850).
DBLACK, CONSTRUcTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS, (2 ed. 1911) p. 301-2;
Sandford's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 U. S. 637, 60 Sup. Ct. 51, 60
affirmig 109 F. (2d) 81 (1939), cert. granted, 307 U. S. 618, 59 Sup. Ct. 836, 83 L. Ed.
1498 (1939); Cannon v. Robertson, 32 F. (2d) 295, 299 (D. Md. 1929); U. S. v. Standard
Brev.ery, 251 U. S. 210, 219, 64 L. Ed. 229, 235, 40 Sup. Ct. 139, 141 (1920); State exrel.
Gallinger v. Smith, 71 Ohio St. 13, 40, 72 N. E. 300, 306 (1904); State v. Evans, 21 Ohio
App. 168, 173, 152 N. E. 776, 778 (1925) (quoting from Industrial Comm. v. Brown, n.
6 supra.).
1139 F. Supp. 742 (W. D. Va. 1941).
1 To have great weight, such practical construction must, as a rule, be long continued.
lerritt v. Cameron, 137 U. S. 542, 552, 11 Sup. Ct. 174, 178, 34 L. Ed. 772, 775 (1890);
Iselin v. U. S., 270 U. S. 245, 251, 46 Sup. Ct. 248, 250, 70 L. Ed. 566, 570 (1926);
Industrial Comm. v. Brown, n. 6 supra; State v. Evans, n. 9 Supra.
12 Fleming v. A. H. Belo Corporation, 121 F. (2d) 207, 213, 214 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941)
(interpretation by Adm'r of Wage and Hour Law can be easily disapproved because not
"acted upon for a number of years.").
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ing of an act. This seems to be the explanation of the holding in the
Thompson case, for if the court had followed another canon of
statutory interpretation, that the intention of the legislature is to be
ascertained primarily from the words used if they are plain and un-
ambiguous,' 3 an opposite result would have been reached. As
pointed out in the Alagann case, defendant is a contract carrier, and
there is nothing in the express language of the lH'otor Carrier Act
which would exclude a contract carrier of mail from its operation.
However, when such a literal interpretation leads to a result that
is unreasonable or absurd, the statute should be construed accord-
ing to its spirit and reason. 4 The court in the Thompson case
argued that it would not be feasible for one under contract with the
Federal Government to be subjected to regulation by the I.C.C.
Nevertheless, an examination of the policy of each of these two
statutes tends to refute this contention.
Congress, in the preamble to the Motor Carrier Act, declared
its purpose to be the regulation of motor carrier transportation so
as "to . . preserve the . . . advantages of, and foster sound economic
conditions in such transportation." 1r Another section of the Act
provides for regulation of "contract carriers by motor vehicle . . .
with respect to . . . qualifications and maximum hours of service
of employees, and safety of operation of equipment." "I The Su-
preme Court in U. S. v. American Trucking Associations, Inc."
pointed out that the purpose of the Act, as evidenced from its legis-
lative history,' 8 was to insure safety of operation and held that it is
confined to employees whose activities affect the safety of operation
of vehicles regulated by the Act. In passing the Fair Labor
Standards Act, -Congress said that it was the policy of the Act to
1 ]LACK, op. cit. supra. note 9, at p. 51 citing Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. 122,
202, 4 L. Ed. 529, 550 (1819); Lemmon v. State, 77 Ohio St. 427, 437, 83 N. E. 608.
610 (1908) (criminal statute); Erie R. Co. v. Steinberg, note 5 supra.
14 BLACK, oP. cit. supra note 9, at p. 66 ciitng In re Matthews, 109 Fed. 603, 616 (IV. D.
Ark. 1901); Clare v. State, 68 Ind. 17, 25 (1879); Roberts v. State, 4 Ga. App. 207.
210, 60 S. E. 1082, 1084 (1908); Ozawa v. U. S., 260 U. S. 178, 194, 43 Sup. Ct. 65.
67, 67 L. Ed. 199, 207 (1922); State ex rel. Mitman v. Greene County, 94 Ohio St. 296,
302, 113 N. E. 831 (quoting KENT COMMENTARIES Ox AMERICAN LAW, 13th ed. p. 461)
(1916). -
1,49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 302.
2 See note 2 "tpra.
27310 U. S. 534, 539, 60 Sup. Ct. 1059, 84 L. Ed. 1345, 1348 (1940).
2-4 Kauper, Federal Regulation of Motor Carriers (1934) 33 Micu. L. REV. 239. At p.
241 the author points out that "the maximum hour provisions contained in bills pro-
posing federal regulation . . . have their inception in considerations relating to public
safety."
eliminate "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of a
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and
general well-being of workers." "9
The solution of the problem in the Magann case, rather than
that in the principal case, seems to be in conformity with the policy
of each of these two inter-meshing statutes. The court granted
plaintiff's request for minimum wages under Section 2o6 of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, thus giving effect to the essential pur-
p 'se of -that Act. Congress, in Section 2o8 (a), had made provi-
-ion for "carrying out the policy of this act by reaching . . . the
objective of a universal minimum wage . . ." Then, by holding
Section 207 (maximum hours and overtime) inapplicable because
of the power of the I.C.C. to regulate as to maximum hours, the
.safety" policy of the Motor Carrier Act was also fulfilled. Though
perhaps not in the mind of the Supreme Court, the practical effect
of the decision in the Ainerican Trucking case is also to guarantee
the jurisdiction of the I.C.C. over those employees affecting safety,
and yet to encroach as little as possible upon employee benefits un-
der the Fair Labor Standards Act.20
D. S. T.
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT-RIGHT OF EMPLOYER AND
EMPLOYEE To DETERMINE REGULAR RATE UPON
XVHiciI To BASE OVERTIME COMPUTATIONS.
For some time prior to the effective date of the Fair Labor
Standards Act,' plaintiffs, employees within the scope of the Act, had
been working 56 hours a week at 6oc per hour. Since the Act would
require compensation to be paid at one and one-half times the regular
rate for every hour over 44, the defendant employer, two days before
the effective date of the Act, gave the plaintiffs the alternative of
continuing at the same rate for 40 hours a week only, or working at
a reduced rate of 524c per hour, with compensation for every hour
s29 U. S. C. A. Sec. 202; Pickett v. Union Terminal Co., 33 F. Supp. 244, 247
(N. D. Texas 1940) (stating that this act was written in the interest of the employee,
its philosophy being to guarantee a minimum wage); H. R. Rep. No. 2182, Apr. 21, 1938
(1 Prentice.Hall 1941 Labor Service pgph. 10,032).
a" See note 17 zwpra, p. 546-7, 60 Sup Ct. 1066, 84 L. Ed. 1353 (that Congress granted
no more "than the customary power to secure safety in view of the absence in the
legilative history of the Act of any discussion of the desirability of giving the Commi.
sicn broad and unusual powers over all employees.").
2 52 STAT. 1060, 29 U. S. C. Sec. 201 ct eq. (Supp. 1939).
